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A LESSON IN INGENUITY: CHINESE FARMERS, THE
STATE, AND THE RECLAMATION OF FARMLAND FOR
MOST ANY USE
Kari Madrene Larson
Abstract: Since 1978, China has achieved significant improvements in the rural
sector through the adoption of the baogan daohu system, which effectively dismantled
the communal farming system and created individual family farms. However,
meaningful measures must be taken to ensure that farmers have continued use of their
farmland and that illegal land reclamation by local govermnents is halted. Because
farmers' rights are not clearly articulated and cannot be readily enforced, local
governments appear to be beyond central government control. Furthermore, due to the
state's right to reclaim land under any logic, farmers' rights may ultimately be non-
existent. Though developing a meaningful system of dispute resolution and enforcement
in rural China will be difficult and require systematic changes in the relationship
between the central and local governments, ignoring the rising problems could prove
disastrous. The underlying conflict between central and local governments and state
and Party policies must be resolved in order for Chinese farming to truly operate
"according to the law."
I. INTRODUCTION
Chinese farmers1 face the daunting task of feeding twenty-two percent
of the global population on only nine percent of the world's arable land.2
Their ability to do so will affect both social stability in the countryside and
China's ability to compete internationally in the twenty-first century.
Despite their importance to China's future, Chinese farmers are in a
precarious position due to their lack of legal rights3 and the ineffective control
by the central government over local government officials. 4 Farmers in China
do not own their land; rather, under the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China, the state owns all land.5 Consequently, the state grants farmers land
Historically, farmers in China have been referred to as 'esants," but this Commet adopts the more
impartial term "fanner." See generally KATE XAO ZHOu, How THE FARMERS CHANGED CHINA 26-27 (1996).
2 Roy L. Prosterman et al., Can China Feed Itself? Sc. AM., Nov. 1996, at 90.
3 See infra notes 94-120, and 157-162 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 163-203 and accompanying text.
5 ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE Guo XAN FA [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIc OF
CHINA], Ch. 1 art. 10 (amended 1993), translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Legislative Affairs Cosmission ed., 1993) [hereinafter P.R.C. CONST.]. Although the state owns all
land, property is governed under a dual system of rural and urban land, with different rights and
governing systems for each. Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo T'u Ti Fa [Land Administration Law of
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use rights, and farmers agree to deliver a quota of specified crops to the
6state. This grant or contract is the complete source of farmers' land rights.
Valid land use contracts must be in writing,7 but few Chinese farmers
have written land contracts in their possession.8 While possession of a
written contract permits a farmer to assert rights embodied within the
contract,9 lack of a written contract leaves a farmer with few legal rights, if
any.10 Even with a contract, however, farmers may have to resort to extra-
legal remedies in vindicating violations of their contractual rights.n'
Despite official thirty-year farming grants, 12 local officials cannot be
relied upon to ensure farmers of their rights. Instead, local officials are
known to reclaim farmland and sell or lease it to investors for illegal purposes
such as development of golf courses and high-class apartments.13 When
illegal land reclamation occurs, farmers have few options. First, they can
attempt to solve the problem by negotiating with local officials.'4
Unfortunately, this may not be successful because these are generally the
same officials who illegally took their land in the first place. 15 Second,
aggrieved farmers can file a claim in the People's Court. 16  But, there is a
striking absence of courts in rural China, as well as a scarcity of lawyers, thus
making it difficult to file a suit.' 7  In addition, were a fanner to receive a
favorable judgement, the government entity needed to enforce the judgment
would be the very same entity that violated the farmer's rights.1 8
the People's Republic of China], arts. 6-9 (1987), translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (Legislative Affairs Commission ed., 1987-1989) [hereinafter P.R C. LAND LAW].
6 ZHOU, supra note 1, 57-58.
7 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
" Roy L. PROSTERMAN ET AL., RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE REPORTS ON FOREIGN AID AND
DEVELOPMENT # 85: REFORMING CHINA'S RURAL LAND SYSTEM: A FIELD REPORT 17 (1994).
9 P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 12.
10 Id
11 See infra notes 204-217 and accompanying text.
12 China: Official Says It's Important to Keep Farmland System Stable, CHINA BUS. INFO.
NETWORK, Apr. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
13 Patrick E. Tyler, Nature and Economic Boom Devouring China's Farmland, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1994, § 1, at 1; Premier Li Peng Calls for Protection of Cultivated Land, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jun. 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Asiapc File.
14 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Nung Yeh Fa [Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China],
Ch.VIII art. 61 (1993), translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Legislative Affairs
Commission ed., 1993) [hereinafter AG. LAW]; see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 176-182 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 172 and accompanying text
17 DAVIDZWEIG, FREEINGCHINA'SFARMERS: RURAL RESTRucT IiNGiN TiE REPoRM ERA 155 n.25, 158-
60(1997).
1 Id. at228.
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In addition to these problems, farmers face added problems when the
land is legally reclaimed. 19 If farmland is taken in compliance with the law,
then farmers have no right whatsoever to contest either the validity of the
taking or the amount of compensation.2° Because compensation is often
missing or inadequate, farmers are left without land and without other means
of support.21
This Comment addresses the current problems plaguing China's rural
land regime. In particular, this Comment analyzes the eminent domain
scheme as it exists in the law as well as how it is implemented in the
countryside. The first section details developments in the property regime in
the twentieth century. The second section describes the current system, how
it developed, and how it works. The third section examines the relationship
between the law and its implementation, paying particular attention to
problems of coordination between central government policies and local
government action. The final section suggests potential changes that could
solve these problems, and concludes that successful solutions to these
problems can only be reached through consideration of both the social and
political context of rural China.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Property Rights and Chinese Farming
Chinese farmers are not unfamiliar with shifting property rights and
land reform.22  Their recent history has been one of redistribution,
collectivization, and decollectivization, with the state continuously "owning"
the land.23
'9 P.RC. CONST. art 10; P.R.C. LAND LAW arts. 21-36.
20 The relevant statute states in part: "When the state requisitions land for construction, the units whose
land is requisitioned should subordinate their wishes to the needs of the state and shall not obstruct the
requisition." P.RC. LAND LAW arL. 23.
21 PROSTERMAN ETAL., supra note 8, at 23.
22 Id at 3.
23 Prior to the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") coming to power in 1949, rual Chinese farmed
independent firms, which they either owned or were owned by wealthy landlords. Shortly after the CCP rose to
power in 1949, policies were implemented which effectively tied the farmers to their land and curtailed any
mobility. In the late 1950s, all farmland was collectivized into huge farms. Then, starting in the late 1970s,
land was decollectivized and returned to individual farming households. ZHOU, supra note 6, at 2-4; KENNETH
LIEBERmL'j, GovERNjNG CHINA: FROMREVOLurION ThROUGH REFORM 39-56, 147-48 (1995).
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Prior to the Communist revolution in 1949, Chinese farmers ran
independent farms, or, if poor, cultivated land owned by wealthy landlords.24
Shortly after the revolution, the government confiscated land owned by
landlords and rich farmers and divided it among all farmers on an egalitarian
basis25 under the Land Reform Act of 1950.26 The state used persuasion,
intimidation, and confiscation in implementing the Act, and redistributed the
land and imprisoned and killed numerous landlords in the process.27
During the 1950s, farming and land rights continued to evolve. In
1955, China implemented the hukou system or "resident permits," which
denied farmers the right to purchase grain in cities, in essence requiring them
to stay on their farms or starve.28  At the same time, China began to
collectivize agriculture. In 1956 and 1957, the state consolidated single
family farms into agricultural collectives. 29  Land was forcibly surrendered
without compensation, and farmers retained only small plots for private use.3°
Collectivization culminated in 1958 with the Great Leap Forward, 31 when the
state merged the collectives, including the individual family plots, into larger
communes with an average size of approximately 4,000 families.32 Under
this collective system, farmers worked in socialist cooperatives of 200-300
households and virtually all farm animals and implements became the
property of the collective.33
Communal fanning's effect on agricultural production was disastrous.
The decline in production was substantial, contributing to one of the worst
24 LIEBERTHAL, supra note 23, at 15-17.
25 CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA 54-55, 105-06 (Brian Hook ed., 1991). Land reform was a
high priority under the communist regime for a number of reasons. Disproportionate land ownership was
viewed as a source of social injustice. Land reform was also viewed as a way to gain and maintain the
vast following of the rural population and strengthen the authority of the new regime. Id
26 "The land ownership system of feudal exploitation by the landlord class shall be abolished, and
the system of peasant land ownership shall be carried into effect in order to set free the rural productive
forces, develop agricultural production, and pave the way for the industrialization of the new China."
Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Nong Ye Gai Ge Fa [The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's
Republic of China] (1950), translated in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 1949-1979, 11 (Harold C. Hinton ed., 1982).27 CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA, supra note 25, at 105.
28 ZwEIG, supra note 17, at 5.
29 MARK SELDEN, THE PoLrTCAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT 187, 190 (1993).
30 PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
31 SELDEN, supra note 29, at 13-15. The Great Leap Forward was a series of policy initiatives
directed at achieving rapid economic and social progress, but which ultimately resulted in the death of
millions of rural Chinese. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 23, at 102-08.
32 PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4-5.
33 CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA, supra note 25, at 54.
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famines in the twentieth century.34 The per capita food energy availability
decreased from over 2100 calories in the mid 1950s to only 1500 calories at
the height of the famine in 1960.35 And, estimates on the number of deaths
due to starvation range from fifteen million to forty million.
36
After the Great Leap famine, the government made adjustments in
property distribution, commune size and administrative structure. 37  The
collectives dissolved and the basic unit for production decreased in size to
approximately 20-30 households. 38  Individual households were again
permitted to farm small plots for personal use in addition to their required
labor contributions to the production teams. 39  The administrative structure
was decentralized. 40  Administrative obligations previously met by the vast
collectives were now delegated to smaller communes. 41  Although the
Cultural Revolution, beginning in 1966, again marked a period of radical
policy changes,42 it did not affect agricultural production in a way reminiscent
of the Great Leap.43 Fanning continued through the 1970s under the
collective model, albeit on a smaller scale. 44
B. Farmers and Property Rights Today: "It is very easy to tell green
onions from tofu ,45
The current property regime in rural China represents a significant
break from the collectivization schemes of the 1950s through the 1970s.
34 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 23, at 102-11; ZHOU, supra note 1, at 3.
31 In addition, these figures are national averages and do not reflect the disparity between urban and
rural grain supply. The famine hit hardest in the rural areas. Basil Ashton et al., Famine in China:
1958-61, 10 POPULATION & DEV. REv. 622-23 (1984).36 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 3.
31 Id. at 48-53.
31 CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA, supra note 25, at 54.
39 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 48-49.
40 For an excellent discussion of the rise and fall of collectivism in Chinese Agriculture, see
EDWARD FRIEDMAN ET AL., CHINESE VILLAGE, SOCIALIST STATE (1991).
41 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 46-53.
42 SELDEN, supra note 29, at 14. The Cultural Revolution occurred from 1966 through the mid
1970s, and was intended to make political, administrative and social changes both in rural and urban
areas of China. It was marked by extreme violence and terror, and resulted in many deaths and mined
lives. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 23, at 111-18.
" ZHOU, supra note 1, at 46-53.
44 id.
45 This is a common saying in Tongxin village meaning that under the baogan daohu system, the
rights, roles and responsibilities of the individual, the collective and the state are distinctly defined. Id. at
58.
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Under the baogan daohu (household responsibility) system,46 which came
into place in the late 1970s, farmers still do not own their farm land, but do
have far more control over the land than previous generations.4 7 In effect, the
baogan daohu system has broken the collective farms into individual family
farms.
48
1. The Baogan Daohu System
The distinguishing feature of the baogan daohu system is that the
primary unit of accounting and production is the household.49 The enactment
of the baogan daohu system divided farmland among individual households
in exchange for the household's agreement to fulfill certain obligations
previously the responsibility of production teams. 50  Under the system,
farmers pay taxes, turn over production quotas, and contribute money to their
villages to cover administrative expenses. 51 After these requirements are met,
farmers are free to decide what to do with their remaining produce.52
The four main elements of the baogan daohu system are as follows:
(1) individual households receive land grants based upon family size; (2)
under the grant, the farming household attains the right to farm the land for a
specified period of years; (3) households rather than production teams make
land use decisions; and (4) actual ownership of the land remains in the hands
of the collectives.53
Farmers have far greater autonomy under the baogan daohu system
compared to collective fanning, primarily because farmers have control over
agricultural production.54 Farmers are permitted to make independent
planting and farm management decisions. 55 They can plant what they want,
4 Baogan daohu (or baochan daohu) means contracting responsibility to the household. Id. at 2-3.
17 Id. at 58-60.
4 See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 56.
50 The production team was the unit of organization for farm labor under collectivized farming. Id.
' Id. The collective is thus reduced to the role of providing technical assistance and selling or
supplying seed, fertilizer and other farm supplies to the households. Farmers in turn pay the collective
certain "dues" or fees which contribute to the collective's public welfare fund, the public capital
accumulation fund, and sometimes a "management fee" (guanli fei), which covers miscellaneous
collective expenses such as subsidies for local cadres. Phyllis L. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors That
Guide Chinese Courts in the Adjudication of Rural Responsibility Contract Disputes, 52 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 101, 103 (1989).
52 Chang, supra note 51, at 103-04.
" PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 7. Currently the grant period is thirty years. Id. at 8.
5 ZHOu, supra note 1, at 76-81.
55 id.
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choose their own methods of fertilization, and can sell their products
wherever they want.56 While almost all farmers must deliver a quota of
specified crops to the state, this requirement does not intrude into
independent management ability because farmers may purchase the required
quota crops on the market and then turn them over to the state.
57
a. Statutory rights
While there is no law specifically governing the baogan daohu system,
provisions within the Land Administration Law and the Agricultural Law
address different aspects of the system.58 Farmers contract state owned
land. 59 While written contracts provide farmers with legal protection when
terms are violated,60 neither the Land Administration Law nor the Agricultural
Law provide remedies for farmers without written contracts.
The plain language of the Agricultural Law requires parties to
"conclude an agricultural contract to define the rights and duties of both
parties. ' 61 Furthermore, while the Land Administration Law provides for a
property recording system, only collectives record rural land holdings, not
individual households.62 This practice indicates that the only record of a
farmer's rights exists within the contract.
b. Contractual rights
Because the provisions contained in both the Land Administration Law
and the Agricultural Law lack specificity, parties use contracts to clarify both
rights and obligations.63 The Agricultural Law not only provides and protects
contract rights but it also requires that "[t]he party awarding the contract and
the contractor shall conclude an agricultural contract to define the rights and
56 Id.
57 Id. For example, if a farmer is required to provide the state with a specific quantity of grain, but
a different crop would be more lucrative, that farmer may grow the more lucrative crop and use the
proceeds to purchase sufficient grain to satisfy his quota requirement.
58 P.R.C. LAND LAW; AG. LAW. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
9 The Land Law provides in pan: "Land owned by collectives and state owned land used by units under
ownership by the whole people or under collective ownership may be operated under a contract by collectives or
individuals for agricultural, forestry, livestock and fishery production." P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 12.
60 The Land Law further provides: "Collectives or individuals that contract to operate land shall have the
obligation to protect such land and make rational use of it according to the uses provided for by the contract.
The right to operate land under contract shall be protected by law." Id.
6' AG. LAW art 12.
62 P.R.C. LANDLAWart 9.
63 See infra note 94, for an example of an actual contract used by a farm household.
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duties of both parties." 64 Under these contracts, farmers can decide matters
relating to production and operation.6' Farmers must still satisfy the state
crop quota, but once they do so, they can sell their remaining produce on the
market.66 They also must fulfill additional duties agreed to in the contracts.67
The Agricultural Law also provides that contractors may subcontract
the land or transfer the rights and duties of the contract to a third party.
68
These contractors have renewal priority, and may transfer contract rights at
death.69 In addition, farmers can contract outside of these provisions to
include greater or lesser rights or duties. 70
2. Development of the Baogan Daohu System
The development of the baogan daohu system began the
decollectivization of the Chinese countryside. 71  Wile the official
government policy prior to 1983 clearly favored the preservation of the
collective production system,72 independent farmers initiated the baogan
daohu system in various regions of the country.73 Farmers secretly contracted
64 "Lands, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed lands, beaches and water surfaces owned by
collectives or the State and exploited by agricultural economic collectives, may be contracted to
individuals or collectives for agricultural production ... [tihe right of individuals or collectives to
undertake operation by contract shall be protected by law." AG. LAW art. 12.
61 Id. art. 13.
66 id.
67 id.
68 id.
69 id.
70 Id. art. 12.
71 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 12.
72 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 69; Cheng Yuk-Shing & Tsang Shu-Ki, Agricultural Land Reform in a
Mixed System: The Chinese Experience of 1984-1994, CHINA INFO., Winter 1995-1996, at 46.
" The most well known incident where the baogan daohu system was secretly adopted took place
in the spring of 1978 in Fengyang County of Anhui Province. In Fengyang County, Party leadership fully
supported small-group fanning, but not individual family fanning. Eighteen households were permitted
by local cadres to farm independent of the collective under the baogan daohu system, and those
households agreed to take care of all dependents of the cadres in the event that the arrangement were
found out and the cadres were arrested. The oath is as follows:
The contracting of production to individual households is to be kept strictly secret and not
divulged to any outsider.
When the grain is harvested, the amount to be rendered to the state will be rendered to the
state, and the amount to be rendered to the collective will be rendered to the collective. Should
there be a large amount of grain, more should be contributed to the state, with no one shirking.
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with local officials in order to farm individual plots of land.74 Though such
actions were forbidden by the central government, the benefits of independent
compared to collective farming were so attractive that farmers were willing to
disobey the government. 75 In fact, so many farmers were willing to disobey
authorities that the aggregate effect went beyond the expectation and control
of the central government.76
Although baogan daohu was initially discouraged, the government
eventually accepted and took credit for the reforms. 77 This policy change was
due in part to China's inability to feed itself under the communal system.78
Recognizing that agricultural outputs increased significantly in regions where
the baogan daohu system was in use, a 1980 meeting of governors formally
adopted the system for use in poor and mountainous areas. 79  By 1983,
ninety-three percent of production teams had adopted the baogan daohu
system. 0 Unable to ignore both the increases in production and the
improvements in living conditions for farmers working under the system, the
central government formally acknowledged the system in 1983.sl
3. Baogan Daohu 's Effect on Property Rights
The manner in which the baogan daohu system developed has major
implications for China's future stability in agricultural production. First, because
the policy started at a grassroots level, no law existed ensuring adequate
Should they [the cadres] come to grief because we are contracting production to individual
households, we are willing to raise the children of village cadres until they are eighteen years of
age.
JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA: POLMCAL CONFUCT AND ECONOMIC DEBATE 28
(1994).
74 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 53-60.
75 Id.
76 Yuk-Shing & Shu-Ki, supra note 72, at 47; ZHOu, supra note 1, at 53-71. Zhou, who conducted a
great deal of field research in rural China, notes an Anhui farmers' saying: "Baochan daohu is like a chicken
pest When one fasnily's chicken catches the disease, the whole village catches it When one village has it, the
whole country will be infected," Id. at 56.
7 Yuk-Shing & Shu-Ki, supra note 72, at 47.
In 1978, approxinately two-fifths of China's urban population depended on imported grain R.D. Hill,
Upland Development Policy in the People 's Republic of China, LAND USE POL'Y, Jan. 8,1994, at 11.
79 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 67.
go PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 7.
" ZHOU, supra note 1, at 69.
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protection of farmers' rights.82 Farmers were secretly contracting with local
officials, while the central government was issuing policy that made these actions
illegal.8 3 Farmers acted at their peril, and suffered the risks of their actions.84
Although actual contracts may have been used prior to the central government's
formal adoption of baogan daohu, these contracts were not enforceable because
they were illegal.
When the central government did finally permit farmers to contract, formal
guidelines indicating what rights and obligations the contracts could create were
absent.8 5 In addition, no comprehensive plan existed to provide redress when a
breach occurred. 86 This problem of poorly defined rights and methods of redress
has continued to plague the baogan daohu system.87
Whether China can adequately address farmers' problems may have dire
consequences for the stability of the rural sector. Farmers defied central
government policy by secretly adopting the baogan daohu system in an attempt
to escape the extreme poverty and poor living conditions associated with
communal farming.88 Because the baogan daohu system effectively ended the
communal farming system,89 farmers are completely dependent upon their ability
to farm their household's plot of land for their livelihood. Since farmers are
willing to defy central policy if their needs are unmet, it is imperative that central
and local governments work together to adequately meet farmers' needs. Failure
to do so may result in social and political instability in the country-side.
90
C. Cracks in the Current System
Although the baogan daohu system has been effective in increasing
agricultural production and is popular among farmers, flaws exist in the
82 The extra-legal nature of baogan daohu's development meant implicitly that no laws existed
governing its use. See notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
a' ZHOU, supra note 1, at 53-71.
R4 id.
85 The Land Law was enacted in 1987, and the Agricultural Law was enacted in 1993. See supra
notes 5, 14.
86 Id.
87 While the Land Law and the Agricultural Law do address aspects of the baogan daohu system,
these laws are neither comprehensive in scope nor uniformly observed. See supra notes 58-70 and
accompanying text; infa notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
n ZHOU, supra note 1, 53-60.
89 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 12.
90 Four Still Held After Peasant Riot Over Land Compensation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 17,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCMP File; Peter Goodspeed, China's Peasants Get Restless:
Rural Protests Send Shock Waves Through Beijing's Urbanized Elite, TORONTO STAR, July 11, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 7266180.
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system. The first shortcoming entails the sporadic written documentation of
land use agreements between farmers and the local government. 91 The
second weakness involves security of tenure issues related to readjustment of
contract land.92 The third problem relates to the practice of redistribution of
land based on changes in family size.
93
1. Lack of Written Contracts
Recent fieldwork conducted in six regions of China revealed that only
two out of 54 households have written land contracts. 94 The majority of
91 See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 109-120 and accompanying text.
9 PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 17. The first land contract the authors viewed was the
following contract which came from a document called the "Agricultural Contract Book." Party A was the
production team and Party B was the head of the farm household. Article One enumerated the rights and
obligations of the production team. ("mu" is a unit measure of land)
Party A contracts _ mu [a number] to Party B. Party A has ownership of the land.
Party A has the right to monitor Party B's operation, the right to collect collective
contributions, and the right to request voluntary labor.
On behalf of the state, Party A will sign a purchasing grain and cotton contract with Party B.
Party A must promote the Communist Party's policies, provide services to Party B, and mediate
disputes over land and irrigation. Party A allows Party B to transfer the use rights of arable
land within state policy and related regulations.
Party A must protect Party B's tight to farming and other legitimate revenue practices. Party A
cannot collect money from Party B without legitimate reason, and the total of collections cannot
exceed five percent of net income.
Article Two contained the rights and obligations of Party B (the fanner):
Party B has the right to freely manage contracted land according to state regulations, policies,
and laws and according to market needs. Party B has the right to a preferable price policy.
Party B has the right to refuse collective contributions and voluntary work which are beyond
regulations.
Party B must complete all of the quota and agricultural tax.
Party B cannot leave land wasted, build a tomb, remove soil, or build a house or brickyard on
the contracted land. Party B must protect the irrigation system and other public facilities
within the contracted land.
Id. at 18-19. Article Three stated that the contract was effective upon the signatures of both parties, but
the contract was unsigned. Article Three also contained dispute resolution methods. Article Four
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farmers claimed to have never received a contract. 95 Other farmers believed
they had a contract but were unable to locate it.96 Additionally, two farmers
claimed to have destroyed their contracts after local officials violated the
contract terms. 97 This lack of documentation has important ramifications for
farmers who seek redress for alleged violations of their perceived rights.
98
2. Short-Term Use Rights
Even farmers with contracts have uncertain duration terms. Initially,
during the early years of the baogan daohu system, the state granted land to
households for a period of three years or less. 99 In 1984, the Communist
Party Central Committee urged local officials to adopt longer terms:
[Officials should] prolong the time period of the contracted land,
encourage the peasants to increase their investment, to foster the
fertility of the soil, and practice intensive operation. Projects
with a long production cycle such as fruit trees, or of a
development nature, such as woods and forests, denuded hill,
and waste land, should have a longer contract period. 100
Long term use rights are especially important for tree crops or where private
investment in irrigation is required. 1° 1 In order for farmers to make long term
investments in crops such as rubber or litchi, land rights must be secure.
10 2
In 1993, the central government further promoted extension of land use
rights to terms of thirty years. 103 Longer land use rights were not
promulgated as law but suggested as practice, and thus are entirely
unenforceable. 104  In 1994, the Governor of Anhui 10 5 declared that farmers
contained more signature lines and those were blank. The contract did not contain a description of the
land nor was there any provision to record the length of tenure. Id. at 18-19.
9' Id. at 17.
96 Id at 18. Although faners were unable to produce writings representing their rights in the land, most
were able to produce documents containing information about taxes and production quotas. Id at 18, n. 33.
9' Id. at 18.
9 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text, and infra notes 171-217 and accompanying text.
99 Id. at 8.
10o Id.
101 Under Chinese growing conditions, Hevea rubber is tappable after the fifth year of growth, and Litchi
nuts (Nephelium litchi) show best results seven to ten years after planting. Hill, supra note 78, at 11.
102 D. GALE JOHNSON, CHINA'S RURAL AND AGIUCULTURAL REFORMS: SUCCESSES AND FAIL.URES, (1996),
available at <http:www.adelaide.edu.au>.
103 PROsTiMAAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 21.
104 Id.
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should receive an extension of use rights to thirty years upon the expiration of
fifteen year contracts. 0 6  Although this may be the official policy of the
region, over half of the residents of Anhui surveyed were not aware of the
length of time of their use rights.10 7 And, one Ministry of Agriculture official,
speaking on behalf of the central government, worried that most new land
contracts are being signed for periods of ten, five, or even fewer years,
instead of the desired thirty year contract.1
0 8
3. Redistribution or Readjustments
Often, local governments redistribute land holdings among local
farmers to reflect changes in household size.109 Because villages control land
allocation, and initially ensured egalitarian distribution among households
based upon family size and land quality, the villages have continued to adjust
land holdings when family size or composition changes due to births, deaths,
marriages, and other such events."0
Land adjustments occur on two scales, small and large adjustments.' 11
Small adjustments are made to retain the egalitarian allocation of land when
family sizes change. 1 2 Where family size increases or decreases, farm size
will increase or decrease respectively, and if household size remains constant,
so too will farm size. 113 On the other hand, big adjustments alter all land
holdings of every individual household within a village, whether there have
been changes within the household or not.114 The village management takes
back all farmland, and farming households receive completely different
land.
11 5
Although central government policy, announced in 1993, would have
"frozen" all agricultural land holdings for thirty years regardless of household
los Anhui is the province where the baogan daohu system originated. ZHou, supra note 1, at 55.
lO PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 21.
107 id.
108 Chen Chumnei, China: Farmers Renew Contracts for Land, CHINA DAILY, May 26, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Asiapc File.
109 Because land is often redistributed on a "per capita" basis, the practice is perceived as egalitarian
and does not meet with the same level of resistance as arbitrary or illegal takings. James Kai-sing Kung
& Shouying Liu, Farmers' Preferences Regarding Ownership and Land Tenure in Post-Mao China:
Unexpected Evidence From Eight Counties, 38 CHINA J. 32, 33-35 (1997).
11o PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 22.
111 Id
112 id.
113 id.
114 id.
115 Id.
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demographic change,1 16 this policy has not been realized in practice. 117
Instead, farmers have insecure land rights based on contracts lasting for ten,
five or even fewer years, and land holdings continue to be adjusted when
household demographics change.118  This insecurity results in a lack of
incentive to invest in farm capital. 1 9  Instead of investing in land
improvements, farmers primarily invest savings in housing, non-farm
enterprises, bank deposits and grain stocks.
120
III. TAKINGS: FARMERS IN A PRECARIOUS POSITION
Although poorly defined contract rights, insecurity of tenure, and
redistribution issues all contribute to a farmer's sense of insecurity, the
problem of both legal and illegal reclamation of farmland in rural China is the
most important problem with the baogan daohu system. The state has the
ultimate right to reclaim land for its own use, and the land holder has no right
to contest either the validity of the use or the level or absence of
compensation paid.
121
A. Why a Standard for Takings is Important
The doctrine of eminent domain in Western jurisprudence dictates that
the state has the right to take privately held land for legitimate public
purposes. 122 The notable difference between Chinese and Western notions of
eminent domain is that under the Western perspective, persons deprived of
their property have a right to contest both the validity of the state purpose, as
well as the justness of the compensation paid. 123 Both of these features, as
well as the right to contest them, are important to the legitimacy of
government action. Because Chinese farmers do not have the right to contest
either the public use or the level of compensation for confiscated land, the
oversight present in Western eminent domain schemes is absent in China.
Where the government is not required to account to the people, it is then in a
status above the law.
116 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
117 Kung & Liu, supra note 109, at 54.
118 Id.
119 JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 11.
120 Id.
121 See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
122 William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REy. 553, 556-57 (1972).
123 Compare id with supra notes 127-212 and accompanying text
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B. Western Standard
A Western standard of eminent domain provides a property holder with
the right to contest both the "justness" of the compensation and the use to
which their land is being put.124  Although most claims alleging non-public
use may meet with little success, 125 litigants can successfully claim that the
level of compensation they have received is not just. 126  The right to contest
both the validity of the public purpose and the level of compensation paid
serves a valuable purpose. It provides legitimacy to state action, as well as a
measurable limit as to how far that action can go.
C. Chinese Standard
Farmers in China experience takings or reclamation by the state both
according to the law and in violation of the law.127  Importantly, farmers
cannot contest a legitimate reclamation of their land. 128 By comparison, when
state or local officials illegally reclaim land, or unlawfully withhold
compensation, farmers can contest state action, yet this right is limited by
both the lack of legal resources and the legal system itself.129  Illegally
reclaimed land results in the conversion of sizable amounts of farmland to
non-agricultural use.' 30  The loss of farmland in China raises alarm with the
central government, 3 ' and around the world. 32
124 See generally Stoebuck, supra note 122.
125 The United States Supreme Court has curtailed litigants' ability to contest public use: "[Wihere
the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Nidkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
126 The right to just compensation is fundamental, and the right to contest is implicit to this concept:
"The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable
principles of fairness, as it does from technical concepts of property law." Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 478 (1972), citing United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
127 Villagers were relocated for the construction of the Three Gorges Dam project, losing their farms
and forced to live on a government stipend of $7 per month. "It came as an order from the leaders. We
had to obey. I didn't really want to move; most of the people didn't want to move. But we had no
choice." Dele Olojede, The Dam is Cast on the Yangtze, NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Asiapc File. Compare legal land reclamation with illegal reclamations by local
government officials for sale to wealthy investors for illegal development, Tyler, supra note 13.
125 P.R. C. LAND LAW art. 23.
129 Id. arts. 43-53; infra notes 171-203 and accompanying text.
13o China Issues Grain Policy Paper Setting Out Agricultural Strategy for Next 35 Years, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS News Library, Asiapc File.
131 China Increasing Protection of Cultivated Land, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 19, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Asiapc File.
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1. Legal Takings
The valid purposes for which the state can requisition land are limited
to economic and cultural reasons, national defense and public works.
33
Farmers are rarely consulted when requisition occurs, and they generally feel
powerless to prevent the occurrence.M Although parties reclaiming land
must adequately compensate farmers under the Land Administration Law,
135
farmers rarely receive adequate compensation for either the loss of their use
rights or for any improvements they may have made. 
136
a. What the Land Administration Law requires
The Land Administration Law specifies procedures for legitimate
reclamation and "adequate" compensation. 137 Allowable use of confiscated land
by the state is limited to "economic, cultural or national defense construction
projects, and for initiating public works."'38  The formal procedure for
reclamation of land for such purposes is general and sparse: the "construction
unit" applies to the land administration department at the county level, 139 and
upon approval, the land administration department reassigns the land.140  The
procedure neither requires nor permits involvement of the landholding party.
Units acquiring requisitioned land must pay land compensation and
resettlement subsidies to the collective unit.141 When cultivated land is
requisitioned, compensation is supposed to be "three to six times the average
annual output value of the requisitioned land for the three years preceding such
requisition.' 142 The law also requires compensation for "attachments and young
crops," which the land administration department at the provincial level
calculates. 14
3
32 Prosterman et al., supra note 2.
133 P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 21.
134 Prosterman et al., supra note 2, at 94.
,131 P.R.C. LAND LAW arts. 27-31.
'36 Prosterman et al., supra note 2, at 94.
137 P.R.C. LANDLAW arts. 23, 27-31.
13 Id. arts. 21, 23.
139 The construction unit applies by "presenting a project plan description or other documents of
approval issued by the competent authority under the State Council or a local people's government at or
above the county level, according to the procedures specified for state capital construction." Id. art. 23.
14 id.
... Id. arts. 27, 28.
142 Id. art. 27.
143 Id.
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In addition to requiring land compensation payments, the Land
Administration Law also requires the payment of resettlement subsidies. 44
These subsidies are based on the average amount of land requisitioned per
person, with a minimum amount of two to three times the average annual output
value of each unit of land for the three years preceding the requisition.
145
Although the Land Administration Law appears to provide generous
compensation and resettlement subsidies to farmers losing their land, in fact, this
is not true. 146 Compensation and resettlement subsidies are to be paid directly to
the collective unit.147 The funds are to benefit the collective unit as a whole, and
individual farm households should only receive direct compensation for
attachments and young crops.1
48
The Land Administration Law also addresses issues of non-compliance by
local governments, but these regulations likewise go unheeded. 149 When local
officials reclaim land with fraudulent approval or no approval at all, those
involved will be subject to liability.' 5° Liability will be charged when the state
oversteps the Land Administration Law guidelines, when bribery occurs, or when
compensation or resettlement subsidies do not reach the intended beneficiary.'
5
'
The land administration department at or above the county level enforces these
provisions, or an injured party may file a suit directly in People's Court.' 52
However, these legislated solutions are ineffective in dealing with takings
incidents in rural China.' 53 Fifty-four percent of farmers surveyed in villages
throughout China were aware of specific takings of agricultural land in their
144 Id. art. 28.
145 Id.
146 The Land Administration Law provides in pertinent part:
All kinds of compensation and resettlement subsidies paid for requisitioned land on account of
state construction, except for the compensation for individually owned attachments or young
crops on the requisitioned land which shall be paid to such individuals, shall be used by the
units being requisitioned to develop production, to provide employment for the extra labour
force due to requisition of the land and as living subsidies for people who cannot be employed;
such funds shall not be used for other purposes and shall not be appropriated by any unit or
individual.
Id. art. 30 (italics added).
147 id
141 And, by implication, the limited right to contest level of compensation and subsidy payment is
vested in the collective unit, not the individual household. Id. art. 29.
149 Id. arts. 43-53.
150 id.
151 Id.
1"2 Id. art. 53.
13 See infra notes 164-207 and accompanying text.
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villages.154 Of those takings, significant compensation was granted for only six
farm households.' 55 Farmers generally had no say in the takings process.
15 6
b. Farmers' rights under the Land Administration Law
Simply put, farmers have limited rights under the Land Administration
Law. When the state reclaims land, farmers have no right to contest the
state's justification. 157 This absence of recourse is particularly problematic
given the high level of corruption at the local level. 158 Additionally, Chinese
farmers cannot contest the level of compensation they receive. 159 Farmers are
unable to directly contest the adequacy of their compensation, 160 and when it
is illegally diverted or withheld, they do not have a direct cause of action.
16 1
Instead, the collective unit must bring a claim on the farmers' behalf.
Because local governments are plagued by corruption, 162 lack of a direct
cause of action is a serious problem for farmers.
Without an enforceable right to contest the takings or the level of
compensation paid, farmers may perceive even legal state reclamation of farm
land as illegitimate.
2. Illegal Takings and the Rule of Law
The ability of central government policies to prevent conversion of
farmland to non-farm purposes is further frustrated by the combination of
widespread corruption and ineffective control over local governments. 163
Local officials often receive large sums of money for permitting land to be
used for non-agricultural purposes. 164 In addition, the central government has
154 PROSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 23.
155 Id.
156 id.
"' P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 23.
158 Louis Putterman, The Role of Ownership and Property Rights in China's Economic Transition,
144 CHINAQ. 1047, 1052 (1995).
159 P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 23.
160 See supra note 148.
161 P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 49.
162 Environment: Millions of Lives are Uprooted in Mass Migration, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov.
8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
163 Putterman, supra note 158.
164 See Tyler, supra note 13. [Hluge profits from land sales tend to overwhelm any fear of the
central Government. With the prospect of millions of dollars in profits on even a small plot of land,
developers and corrupt officials are often willing to take the risk of ignoring instructions from Beijing."
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been unable to assert sufficient control over local governments: "The greatest
obstacle to the present decentralization in China lies in the ambiguity on the
part of the government about the definition of authority., 165  The nature of
power and authority, and by implication, legitimacy, is not defined by law.
166
Instead, Chinese law is an instrument of Party politics to be interpreted by the
National People's Congress. 167  Laws can be rendered ineffective by Party
directives, and local government legitimacy is not a result of adherence to law
but rather compliance with Communist Party policy.
168
Lack of central control over local governments is magnified by
corruption at, the local level. 169  Local governments take advantage of the
opportunities that decentralization brings, loosely interpreting existing law, or
in the extreme, manipulating power for their own advantage and personal
gain.
170
a. Solving problems without the courts
Most Chinese legislation provides a mechanism for attempting to
resolve disputes with the local level of government prior to initiating
Philip Shenon, Good Earth is Squandered. Who'll Feed China?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File.
161 Wang Xi, Comment, The Problem of Decentralization in China, in ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 239, at 242 (James A. Dorn & Wang Xi eds., 1990)
166 Id. China's decentralization is plagued by problems due to the structure of the political system.
[W]ith respect to administration, power is subdivided between the central government and local
governments, and between the government administrators and enterprises. On the other hand,
the Party organizations on different levels, which parallel the corresponding levels of
administration and enterprises, are still centrally controlled from the top to the bottom.
Id. at 243. State policy and Party policy co-exist: boundaries are often blurred and courts are not always
clear whether they are relying on state or Party policy in making decisions. Chang, supra note 51, at 107
n. 18.
16, Carol A. G. Jones, Capitalism, Golbalization and the Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of
Legal Change in China, Soc. & LEGAL STUD., June 1994, at 208. A professor at Beijing University, Zhou
Wangsheng, commented on recent improvements in this area: "There is a common saying that the NPC
(National People's Congress) is a rubber stamp. But this image has been undergoing some change. It has
changed from a low quality rubber stamp to a good quality rubber stamp." James Kynge, In Congress:
Perhaps Some Surprises: China's Rubber-Stamp Body May Have Bounce, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 4, 1998, at A2.
168 Jones, supra note 167.
169 Peter Goodspeed, Corruption a Fact of Life in the "New China, " TORONTO STAR, Aug. 1, 1993,
avaiable at 1993 WL 7269876. During 1996, more than 65,400 Chinese officials were convicted of
bribery, favoritism and "malfeasance." China to Establish Agency to Combat Corruption Within
Government, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, BNA File.
170 Jones, supra note 167.
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litigation. 17 1 While this may be good in theory, it is not so effective in
practice. Under Article 13 of the Land Administration Law, the basic
tenet requires parties to first negotiate disputes prior to any court action. 172
The Land Administration Law provides that "[o]wnership of land and right
to the use of land shall be protected by law. No unit or individual shall
infringe upon such ownership and right.', 173 When disputes arise, they
"shall be solved through consultation between the parties. If no agreement
can be reached through consultation, they shall be decided by the people's
government."' 174 Importantly, the people's government at or above the
county level decides disputes arising between units of government,
whereas disputes in which one of the parties is an individual are to be
decided at the township or county level. 175
Negotiating with the local government, however, is often not very
useful to the farmer because the party at the local level of government with
whom the farmer must meet is also generally the party that violated the
farmer's rights under the contract.' 76 One occurrence of informal politics
undermining control of the central government took place in Tangquan
Township, Wujiang County between 1985 and 1987.177 In that instance,
officials responsible for administering the Land Law yielded to pressures
of friends, family, and colleagues, by permitting farmland to be
appropriated for housing construction under the pretext of "town
development.' 178 Farmers were furious, 179 yet the only recourse available
was to send letters and photographs to provincial, city and county
governments' 180  County government officials unsuccessfully requested
town officials to investigate, so the matter was effectively dropped. 18 1
This incident illustrates the fact that while the county is able to control
171 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 158-60.
172 P.R.C. LAND LAW art. 13.
' Id. art. 11.
174 Id. art. 13.
175 Id.
176 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 228.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
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very large scale developments, activity at the local level is often beyond
the reach of the law.1
8 2
b. The Chinese legal system
Once a farmer has exhausted his remedies achievable through
negotiations with local government officials, his next step is to file a claim
in the People's Court. 183 But this solution is not realistic either. The legal
system in rural China is not very effective, as there are few courts, few
lawyers, and essentially limited accessibility to either.'84
Farmers have little access to the court system, and even so, access
is no guarantee of adjudication on the merits or a fair trial. 185 Under the
Constitution, courts are independent, 186 but in reality, they are "weak
institutions under heavy influence from Party and regional interests."
187
The Vice President of the People's Supreme Court recently noted that
taking local authorities to court has always been difficult for farmers.188
Applications to file writs are routinely turned down, and lower courts
often make excuses in order to reject or delay farmers' lawsuits.1 89 When
a dispute does reach the court, the rights and obligations enumerated
within the contract are not the major issues.190 Instead, determinations are
made according to Party policy, which by implication means that the rights
under the contract are not controlling. 191
Moreover, there are very few lawyers in rural China. 192 After the
development of the People's Republic of China in 1949, many lawyers
were killed, imprisoned, removed from office, or chose not to practice
182 Id. Cadres can also take a farmer's land for personal use, and similarly, the farmer has little
recourse. But, wealthier rural residents often have significant resources with which to confront cadre
authority. Id. at 242.
13 P.R.C. LANDLAW art. 13.
184 Interview with Steve Dickinson, Affiliate Assistant Professor, University of Washington; Director
of Corporate Operations for Michiels International, Inc., in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 5, 1997) [hereinafter
Dickinson Interview].
185 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 177.
186 P.RC. CONST. art 126.
18? Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INT'LL. & TRADE 18 (1996).
188 PRC: Law Courts Must Protect Legal Rights of Farmers, available in World News Connection
(visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.
189 Id.
'90 ZWEIG, supra note 17, at 177.
191 Id
'2 Dickinson Interview, supra note 184.
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law. 193 Between 1957 and 1958, the state shut down all law schools, and
in 1959, closed the Justice Ministry. 194 During the Cultural Revolution,
legal workers were among the first people to be sent to the countryside for
"re-education," and the law schools were again closed in 1966 and did not
reopen until 1977.'95 These events resulted in an extreme shortage of
trained lawyers, which is especially acute in rural areas.
196
c. Enforcement ofjudgments in rural China
If a farmer is fortunate enough to receive a judgment in his favor, he
then must bear the burden of attempting to enforce that judgment. 97
Generally, local police or branches of the military are unwilling to assist with
enforcement, thus the farmer must attempt to assert his judgment without
outside assistance.' 98 Without means to enforce a judgment, the judgment is
without great value.
The largest obstacle to providing a means for enforcement of
judgments is the organization of the system itself.199 Courts and judges
depend upon local governments for their jobs and their finances.200  For
example, when executing a judgment against a local enterprise, a judge in
Fujian found his daughter transferred to a remote rural outpost by her
employer (the county).20 1 Without the necessary separation of powers and
influence between local government and local courts, the task of enforcing
judgments will be formidable at best.
Although the central government is aware of this problem and is
reputedly working to strengthen the legal branch of the government, this
charge is no easy task. The size and diversity of the regions are daunting, and
the strength of the regions is growing rapidly:20 2 "[I]t has become harder to
enforce the will of the central government than at any other time since the
revolution, [and] it will take a long time before the courts, especially outside
Alsen, supra note 187, at 16.
194 id
195 Id
196 Id; ZwEG, supra note 17, at 155.
197 Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgments in China, 141 CI1NAQ. 65 (1995).
19 Id at 71-72. Even in instances of local officials using'Torce" to settle lawsuits, courts are still unable to
provide assistance, as local officials far out-power the courts in resources. Alsen, supra note 187, at 18.
199 See generally Clarke, supra note 197.
200 Id. at71.
201 id
202 Alsen, supra note 187, at 19.
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the biggest metropolitan areas, can be relied on as competent, powerful and
impartial decision makers. 20 3
d Extra-legal resolution methods: guanxi, bribery, clans, secret
societies, gangsters, violence and revolution
Because farmers lack adequate resources for solving their legal problems,
they may resort to age-old social mechanisms for solving problems within the
village.204 Rural China has long been governed by a system of control based
upon ritual, tradition, and family relationships as opposed to control based upon
the law and the legal system. 205 This system of control is also referred to as
guanxi, or "rule of relationships," as opposed to "rule of law."
206
Where legal methods of dispute resolution are not successful, peasants
have been willing to resort to more drastic measures. The following story
serves as an illustration of the extent to which farmers will go when their
demands are unmet.20 7 In the 1970s, a language school purchased land to
build a back road.20 8 After some years had passed, the nearby commune
presented the school with a bill, on the grounds that the purchase price was
too low, too much land was taken, and that both water mn-off and excess
shade resulted from the construction of the school, diminishing farm
production. 20 9 The school refused to pay, and the farmers dumped garbage at
the back entrance.210 The school continued to stall, so the farmers blocked
the sewers.2 1 After this move, the school then began to negotiate.212
While the above example may appear as a relic of bygone days, in fact,
the number of disputes in rural areas is growing.213 The growth in disputes
has been attributed to the social, political and moral complexity resulting from
203 id.
204 ZHOU, supra note 1, at 12-17. A motto of rural "purchasing agents" who were especially adept at
procuring scarce raw materials is as follows: "endure numerous hardships; cross one thousand mountains
and ten thousand streams; speak one thousand dialects and ten thousand words; and use one thousand
means and ten thousand schemes." Id. at 113.
205 FEI XIAOTONG, FROM THE SOIL: THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE SOCIETY 101-107 (Gary G.
Hamilton & Wang Zheng trans., 1992).
206 Jones, supra note 167 at 197.
207 SELDEN, Supra note 29, at 200.
208 id.
209 id.
210 id.
211 Id.
212 id.
213 A Few Observations on Some Problems of Comprehensive Control of Public Order and Security
in RuralAreas, available in World News Connection (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.
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recent reforms, as well as ignorance or aversion to use of the legal system to
resolve disputes.2 14 In addition, the inability of the central government to
coordinate local action has permitted a breakdown in social order and enabled
the growth of criminal activity. 215  Because disputes often affect major
interests and rights of the parties involved, the disputes have led to "armed
clashes, which again end up in such criminal acts as bodily injury, murder,
arson, sabotage of production, and serious disruption of public order., 2 16
Many attribute the development of the baogan daohu system to
farmers' willingness to engage in illegal methods of solving problems.217 This
willingness should serve as a reminder that unless the government will
provide necessary solutions, farmers may decide to adjust the system once
again.
D. What China Needs
A potential solution to the problems affecting Chinese farmers is to
create an objective means of dispute resolution and a connected system of
enforcement. This solution takes into account the legal implications for
farmers' rights because it provides an avenue of redress that makes those
rights meaningful. This solution is also mindful of the context in which the
law operates in rural China, because the objective means of dispute resolution
and subsequent enforcement of these decisions would be sufficiently removed
from the influence of local officials.
Critical to the success of this proposal are two requirements. First,
farmers' rights under their contracts must be clearly articulated and made
systematic. This objective would require not only developing a
comprehensive document to be used in land transactions, but also mandating
its use. Second, and most importantly, the state's eminent domain powers
should be restricted to takings for the limited purpose of "public use," and a
party suffering from an illegal or under-compensated land reclamation should
have the opportunity to challenge directly that state action. The ability to
bring individual claims rather than to rely on the collective unit to protect
214 Id.
215 Id. "Crimes that have rarely been seen in the past ... all have now also become occasional
occurrences, and all those popularly referred to as 'train robbers and highway bandits,' 'cross-river
dragons,' 'local snakes,' and 'crafty old rats' are going about their misdeeds with extreme insolence." Id.
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
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farmers' rights will help ensure that the state and its local representatives
abide by the same law they use to assert their power.
1. A Right to Contest, Both Legal and Illegal Takings
"When farmland is reclaimed by the state, either legally or illegally,
farmers should have the right to contest whether the state's justification meets
the "purpose" requirement under the Land Administration Law,2t 8 and
whether the amount of compensation paid for the land is sufficient. Farmers
should have an individual right of action under the compensation provisions,
and not have to rely on the collective unit to assert their rights. 21 9 In addition,
the Land Administration Law should provide farmers with a right to directly
contest any illegal withholding or diverting of compensation by local
government officials.
Chinese farmers should also be granted the right to contest the purpose
of the takings. Although the permitted purposes within the Land
Administration Law are very broad,22° the addition of a right to contest would
be meaningful. It would help ensure the government's legitimacy and
authority.
2. An Impartial and Meaningful Way to Contest Illegal Reclamation
In order to create a meaningful dispute resolution mechanism in the
countryside, China must do two things. First, farmers must receive access to
neutral and fair adjudication. To accomplish this, either the existing judicial
system can be altered or independent tribunals can be created to specifically
hear agricultural contract disputes. If the existing system is to be effectively
altered, issues of access to legal resources, and corrupt local officials, must
be addressed.22'
Second, in order for dispute resolution to function effectively, farmers
must be aware of their legal rights, and be able to assert them. This
awareness can be accomplished through a combination of education and
access to legal resources. The land administration department can take an
active role in education, focusing on the purpose and value of land contracts.
The land administration should draft a standard-form contract to be used for
215 See supra note 138 and accompanying text
210 See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
220 See supra note 138 and accompanying text
221 The specific details of how to reform a cornpt judicial system are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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all land use agreements throughout China. The department should also design
a procedure for local officials to follow when entering contracts with farmers
which identifies and clarifies rights and responsibilities. Ideally, farmers
should have access to lawyers, but given the extreme shortage of lawyers in
China,22 2 this is not realistic. Although the central government is hopeful that
the number of lawyers will grow, this increase will probably not be felt in the
countryside.22 3
Instead, the government must take a proactive role in ensuring that
legal access is available to all Chinese farmers. Both the creation of neutral
and fair dispute resolution mechanisms and the education of farmers
regarding their legal rights will increase farmers' willingness to seek out
"legal" solutions to their contractual problems.224
3. A Means of Enforcing Judgments
In order to encourage farmers to seek out "legal" solutions to their
contractual problems, judgments must be enforceable. Without means to
enforce a judgment, the judgment is without great value. This is a serious and
difficult problem because implicit in its solution is a significant change in
China's system of governance. The problem results from the absence of
separation of powers between local officials and local courts, and the
significant influence local officials have in the administration of government
in rural China.225  This obstacle is complicated by the problems of
decentralization that China has been unable to effectively solve. The central
government cannot control local government action, and the Party controls
the state, which precludes true adherence to a rule of law.
While specific recommendations could be made regarding enforcement
options, these would not be realistic until the countryside can adhere to the
222 See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
2" Report Says Citizens' Legal Protection Increasing, available in World News Connection (visited
Feb. 6, 1998) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>; China Needs a Large Number of Legal Professionals, available
in World News Connection (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.
224 In fact, the increasing reliance or acceptability of "legal" dispute resolution is on the rise in
China, and this can be attributed to a growing awareness of the law. Report Says Citizens' Legal
Protection Increasing, available in World News Connection (visited Feb. 6, 1998)
<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>. One of the most popular new TV shows, Court Fax, offers live transmissions
of cases being tried in intermediate courts, and hundreds of Chinese news sources offer legal affairs
columns. "Awareness of the law has increased remarkably and the notion that "one can protect his or her
rights and interests by resorting to the law" is becoming widely accepted." PRC: Law Courts Must
Protect Legal Rights of Farmers, available in World News Connection (visited Feb. 6, 1998)
<http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.
225 See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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"rule of law." However, hope remains. In fact, recent attempts at
establishing local elections may have significant success in establishing order
in rural China.226 Although the central government may be unable to control
local officials, that doesn't preclude farmers from asserting a legitimate,
organized front. The threat of losing office may be significant impetus for
local officials to follow the central government policies requiring increased
protection of farmers' rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resolving issues of tenure security for farmers in rural China has major
implications for agricultural production and social stability in rural China and
the rest of the world. The central government must take meaningfil measures
to ensure tenure security for farmers and end illegal government land
reclamation, in order to sustain the significant improvements in the rural
sector achieved through the adoption of the baogan daohu system. As
previously suggested, farmers' rights must be clearly articulated and made
enforceable. This will involve coordinating local and central government
action. Though developing a meaningful system of dispute resolution and
enforcement in rural China will be difficult and require systematic changes in
the relationship between the central and local governments, ignoring the rising
problems could prove disastrous. The underlying conflict between central
and local governments and state and Party policies must be resolved in order
for Chinese farming to truly operate "according to the law."
226 The Most Extensive Practice of Socialist Democracy, available in World News Connection
(visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>. Officials are otherwise appointed.
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